

The Securitization of Energy Issues from The Perspective of Security Studies

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Abstract

Security studies debated the phenomenon of "high politics," such as politics and the military, at the outset of their development. As the study's object, it discusses the arms race, nuclear war, and political coups. Following the end of the Cold War, the economic, social, and environmental sectors became subjects of study in security studies. Not only that, but security studies also address issues that are frequently overlooked, such as energy issues. This is undeniably one of the most pressing issues in security studies today. The energy issue discusses how the country's foreign policy efforts will be carried out in order to avoid the threat of domestic energy scarcity. The inclusion of energy issues in security studies does not happen overnight. Through this scientific article, the author intends to examine how energy issues can become part of security issues. The author employs the concept of securitization to examine the securitization of energy issues from the standpoint of a security study. The author used a qualitative method in this study, with secondary data collection (journals and archive documents) as part of the data collection technique. The discussion of this scientific article has resulted in the securitization of energy issues being divided into three stages. Non-securitization, politicization, and securitization are the stages. Energy issues are not considered security issues during the non-securitization stage. When the energy issue becomes politicized, it poses a real threat that the government must address. Meanwhile, security issues have defined threats in the securitization stage. However, this securitization process will only take place if the audience accepts the threat and the state takes responsibility for mitigation efforts. The author comes to the conclusion that the securitization of energy issues is mutual between the state and the audience (society).

Keywords:

energy security, security studies, securitization, threats

1. Introduction

The energy issue is an exciting topic to discuss in the study of International Relations. Following the Cold War, issues in the study of International Relations evolved. This evolution is inextricably linked to the shift in this study's actors from countries to non-state actors such as multinational corporations, international organizations, individuals, and non-governmental organizations (Kegley & Blanton, 2011). Changes in issues or cases occurred alongside the development of International Relations actors in this study. Energy is one case or issue that is frequently discussed insufficiently. Today, all countries require energy as part of their resilience and security. Supply constraints can have an impact on the country's energy security and resilience. Furthermore, countries can use energy as a tool for foreign policy, potentially sparking international conflict (Carvalho et al., 2014). Germany's strategic

cooperation to secure its energy needs is one example of how energy issues become part of the discourse in the study of International Relations. In 2021, Germany's consumption of fossil fuels will reach 77%.

Germany is forming strategic alliances with Norway for oil supply, Russia for natural gas consumption, and the United States for coal supply in order to maintain its energy security (Schiffer et al., 2022). Aside from needs and consumption, energy is also closely linked to the issue of climate change. Policy on energy security is sometimes separated from the policy on climate change mitigation. Despite the fact that the two are related (Nyman, 2018). For example, Vietnam implemented several energy diversification policies, such as the Green Growth Strategy and the National Climate Change Strategy. Vietnam devised this strategy to counteract the threat of energy scarcity and reliance on fossil fuels. They put this policy into action by developing solar and wind energy to meet domestic demand while mitigating the threat of climate change (Urban et al., 2018).

According to Daniel Yergin, the state engaged in a variety of political and foreign policy manoeuvres to protect its interests in the energy sector (Yergin, 2011). Natural resources such as oil and natural gas encourage countries to safeguard their geopolitical interests in energy-rich areas (Yergin, 2011). Hans Morgenthau, a theorist in the field of international relations, stated that natural resources such as fossil energy are one indicator of national strength (Morgenthau & Thompson, 2006). Morgenthau believes that countries with control over energy resources will have a stronger negotiating position and bargaining power in the diplomatic process (Morgenthau & Thompson, 2006). The primary reason for countries to engage in various foreign policy manoeuvring strategies to advance their interests in the energy sector is as part of their efforts to achieve energy security. According to Robert W. Orttung and Jeronim Perovic, energy security is a state strategy for achieving national interests in the energy sector (Orttung & Perovic, 2010). They claim that each country's national interest in the energy sector is unique. Producer countries want to keep their output stable while also profiting from the energy market (Orttung & Perovic, 2010). Meanwhile, consumer countries are attempting to meet energy demand while maintaining affordable prices (Orttung & Perovic, 2010). On the one hand, Michael T. Klare defined energy security as the sum of all energy supplies owned by the state and maintained in a stable condition (Klare, 2013). Every country's strategy for securing its energy interests must be informed by the realization that energy security is a critical issue. Countries are aware that unless they secure their energy security, their social, political, and economic stability will be jeopardized.

Threats emerge in security studies as a result of securitized security issues (Buzan et al., 1998). These threats have the capability of exploiting state vulnerabilities (Buzan et al., 1998). The threat in the context of energy security can take the form of scarcity or disruption of energy supply, which has the potential to jeopardize the dimensions of social, economic, and political life (Liedtke, 2017). If the threat becomes dangerous, the government must institutionalize efforts to prevent vulnerabilities from being exploited (Buzan & Weaver, 2003). In essence, this article will explain how energy can be securitized in order to become a security issue. Criteria for energy security have different perspectives. Producing countries, for example, see energy issues as a threat when they do not profit from selling petroleum or their export supply is disrupted. In the past, the Russian government has explored natural resources in the form of oil and natural gas. The Russian government has 103.2 billion barrels of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region. However, the conflict between Russia, Ukraine, and Europe resulted in a drop in oil prices as a result of economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the European Union (Karatayev & Hall, 2020). Distributors or transit countries, on the other hand, see the threat of an energy security issue from a different angle. Syria is not a country that produces oil. Iran, on the other hand, sees Syria as a strategic country because it has the potential to become a distributor area for crude oil exports to Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. The Iranian government has constructed a pipeline to transport Iranian oil to the Mediterranean Sea. However, due to the disruption of oil distribution channels caused by the civil war, Syria has lost foreign exchange (San-Akca et al., 2020). From the standpoint of the importing country, the threat posed by the issue of energy security is energy scarcity. Importing countries cannot produce fossil energy because they lack oil reserves. When there is a disruption in the supply of petroleum, importing countries are vulnerable to supply shortages, or the prices of fossil energy commodities rise to the point where they are no longer afford to purchase (Intriligator, 2015; Taibi et al., 2016). Energy scarcity can be alleviated by importing countries with the

necessary technology and funds, as well as by focusing research on renewable energy. The European Union, for example, is diversifying its energy sources toward renewable energy (Maltby, 2013). Unfortunately, this point does not apply to countries with limited fossil resources and a lack of alternative energy technology. Balkan countries are affected by this issue (Morina, 2015). Table 1 below shows the country's typology and energy security threats in a matrix table.

Table 1. State typology and threat criteria in energy sector (Badaruddin, 2016; Gökçe et al., 2021; Naor, 2019).

<i>Threat Criteria</i>	<i>Producer Countries</i>	<i>Transit Countries</i>	<i>Consumer Countries</i>
	Market price volatility; low income margins; low oil demand; decreased production capacity; competition among producer countries.	Conflict; economic sanctions; energy diversification; policy transition; civil war; transit countries often are trapped in the regional or global conflict between great powers; heavily dependent on oil supply and demand.	Heavily dependent on oil producer countries; lack of natural oil resources; unable to access oil market; unable to procure energy supply on affordable prices.

According to Table 1 above, different threat issues in the energy sector exist based on country typology. Threats to the energy sector can arise in the form of low purchasing power in consumer countries, decreased demand for petroleum on the global market, and competition between oil-producing countries for countries with abundant natural petroleum resources (Badaruddin, 2016). However, when viewed through the eyes of a transit country, the threat issue in the energy context takes on a different hue. Energy threats in transit countries arise when producing and consuming countries change their energy policies. The most significant disadvantage for transit countries is that their survival is dependent on the flow of supply and demand between energy-producing and consuming countries. Furthermore, transit countries are frequently caught up in regional conflicts between the two major powers, such as Lebanon in the Middle East and Ukraine in Eastern Europe (Naor, 2019; San-Akca et al., 2020).

Oil-importing countries, on the other hand, have different perspectives on energy threats. Consumer countries believe that they are not endowed with abundant energy resources. As a result, they are extremely reliant on supplies obtained from oil-producing countries. These two indicators are a threat to their energy security if they cannot access the global petroleum market and do not have sufficient purchasing power (Gökçe et al., 2021). As we can see above, the country requires energy as a primary need as well as an export commodity for trade. This phenomenon is a type of securitization process. According to Barry Buzan, securitization is the process of politicizing threats that were previously unimportant. However, these threats can cause disruption and must be mitigated (Buzan et al., 1998). If not addressed, energy issues, like other security issues, can pose a threat to the security sector. For example, due to domestic needs and demands to develop its property industry, Russia has prioritized energy issues as part of its national security (Saneev, 2014). China, like Russia, has prioritized energy to support its economic growth. As a developing country, China believes that disruptions in Middle Eastern oil supplies pose a threat to its economy. As a result, China secures energy issues by mitigating threats by expanding energy cooperation to Latin America, including Venezuela, and Central Asia (Ramadhan & Pratiwi, 2020; Sun, 2014).

Based on the literature reviewed above, the author will investigate how the process of securitizing energy issues can become a security issue. The preceding literature example explains how a social problem or issue that was previously unrelated to the security issue has now become an integral part of this study. This paper intends to examine how the securitization process can be used to transform energy issues into security issues. However, energy issues are significant sectors that influence the dynamics of security, foreign policy, and international interactions (Yu & Dai, 2012). In this scientific article, the author proposes a problem formulation guide while explaining the securitization process. The problem

formulation is essentially a writing guide that is addressed using relevant theories, concepts, and methodologies (Creswell, 2014). The author's formulation of the problem is as follows: **"How is the state's process of securitization of energy issues carried out in the context of security studies?"**

2. Methodology

This study employs a qualitative approach. In practice, qualitative methods in social science are used to analyze a wide range of phenomena, processes, policies, and social values using a non-numerical approach (Hammarberg et al., 2016). When a study intends to analyze social phenomena that cannot be quantified, qualitative methods are used (Hammarberg et al., 2016). Non-numerical analysis can be used to explain exploratory and descriptive social phenomena. In general, qualitative research employs language to facilitate scientific thinking (Hammarberg et al., 2016). The purpose of this article is to provide a descriptive analysis of the process of transforming an issue into a security issue via the securitization stage. The author employs a "semi-systemic review" approach during the analysis and discussion stage. This method emphasizes the use of scientific data or citations to strengthen analysis (Snyder, 2019). One of the stages is the analysis stage, which uses appropriate theories and concepts to answer the problem formulation. Furthermore, the author's argument is bolstered by the use of data in the form of journals and documents that are closely related to the topic of scientific articles (Snyder, 2019). In terms of preparing this scientific article, the author follows a postpositivist approach, emphasizing the criteria for writing articles sequentially, beginning with the preparation of the background, methods, theories, discussions, and conclusions (Creswell, 2014). Furthermore, postpositivist articles must include empirical data to back up their claims (Creswell, 2007). The author employs empirical data that is secondary data, namely scientifically justifiable documents, journals, or proceedings. Secondary data in social science scientific articles can be obtained from data sources such as Scopus, Dimension, or PubMed (Creswell, 2014). The process of data analysis can be described in Table 2.

Table 2. Stages of qualitative analysis methods (Creswell, 2014; Hammarberg et al., 2016; Roselle & Spray, 2012; Snyder, 2019).

	Secondary Data	Analysis	Conclusion
Stage of Analysis	Secondary data in the form of scientific journals compiled from credible journal data centers such as Scopus and Dimensions is used by the author. The author gathers secondary data by searching for keywords such as energy security and security studies.	The writer employs a reflective approach during the analysis stage. This method emphasizes the author's point of view on constructing arguments about specific social phenomena. The author then supports this argument in a systemic review; the argument is constructed using empirical results from previous research gathered through secondary data. Furthermore, the author employs a theoretical framework to develop arguments in response to the problem formulation.	At this point, the writer uses a reflective, argumentative approach to respond to the problem formulation, which is the analysis result. Following the analysis stage, the author will draw conclusions about how energy security issues are securitized based on the conceptual framework of security studies supported by valid secondary data.

3. Conceptual Framework

The study of security studies is constantly evolving. Security studies discussed political and military issues at the start and throughout the Cold War (Hough, 2008). The concentration of security issues in these two areas was inextricably linked to the rivalry between the two great world powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The studies covered high-level political issues like a military invasion,

nuclear war, political coups, and arms races (Buzan, 1983; Buzan et al., 1998). However, following the end of the Cold War, security issues and the study of International Relations saw a shift in actors and issues. One example is that security issues are no longer primarily concerned with politics and the military but rather with environmental, economic, and social concerns (Buzan et al., 1998). The actor in the security study also changed. In security studies, the state is no longer the dominant actor. Non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and even individuals, wield equal power and share in the security studies unit of study (Kegley & Blanton, 2011). This shift in issues and actors is inextricably linked to the world's increasingly complex political problems. These issues arise as a result of changes in the social dynamics of society and the state. As a result, security studies must eventually address issues that were previously ignored, such as environmental, technological, energy, economic, and social concerns (Buzan & Hansen, 2009).

The author employs the concept of securitization, which is widely used in various security studies. The concept of securitization originated with the Copenhagen School, which attempted to explain how an issue can become a security issue (Van Rythoven, 2019). Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde initiated securitization to investigate the threats that arise as a result of the securitization of security issues (Van Rythoven, 2019). Securitized threats, according to security studies, can essentially threaten an object, making it feel vulnerable and insecure (Van Rythoven, 2019). Buzan explained that threats could be classified as traditional or non-traditional (Buzan et al., 1998). Traditional threats, for example, are political and military in essence. Typically, this threat takes the form of a military invasion or a political coup (Buzan et al., 1998). Meanwhile, non-traditional threats typically manifest themselves in the social, economic, and environmental domains. Non-traditional threats include ethnic conflict, inflation, resource scarcity, and global warming (Buzan et al., 1998). The process of securitization and the emergence of a threat are both linked. This correlation was eventually one of the catalysts for the emergence of the securitization process. An important point to remember during the securitization process is that these threats can appear in both traditional and non-traditional forms, with the potential to threaten security objects on multiple levels: politically, militarily, economically, environmentally, and socially (Van Rythoven, 2019). Political institutions and political leaders like the president or prime minister can declare the security issue or “speech act” to the audience, namely the people, as an essential process in securitization (Baele & Rousseau, 2022; Kalkman, 2019). An issue cannot be classified as a security issue unless a threat declaration is made.

Threat terminology in security studies has evolved significantly as a result of the evolution of human social and political dynamics. Buzan first defined a threat as any impediment to a state or political institution achieving its objectives (Buzan, 1983). Buzan began by defining threats that invariably emerge from the political and military sectors. Political coups and military invasions are two examples. Buzan, on the other hand, redefined the threat definition to include not only the political and military sectors but also the economic, environmental, and social sectors (Buzan et al., 1998). In this modern era, threats include not only invasions or coups but also global warming, genocide, and inflation (Buzan et al., 1998). The inability of a unit, organization, or individual to respond to threats is referred to as vulnerability. The vulnerability is inextricably linked to the threat's form. A country that is vulnerable to invasion, for example, is one that lacks a strong defense system. A military invasion is a critical security threat for countries with weak defense systems (Baggott & Santos, 2020; Buzan et al., 1998). Buzan contends that threats and vulnerabilities are closely intertwined. Threats and vulnerabilities differ by the security sector. According to the dynamic security sector, security issues are no longer discussed at the highest levels of government. Low-level political issues such as technology, social, economic, and energy have evolved into new security issues (Buzan & Hansen, 2009; Williams, 2013).

According to Jori Kalkman, the declaration would be meaningless if it was not accepted. Furthermore, if there is no audience, the declaration of security issues will be meaningless (Kalkman, 2019). The audience acts as either the receiver or the rejector of the security issue declaration. If the public or the audience accepts the declaration, political institutions must take steps to mitigate the threats that arise (Kalkman, 2019). When declaring a threat, the state must essentially persuade the audience or the general public that the threat of security issues can jeopardize the expected life of its people (Sheikh, 2018). As a result, in the securitization process, the declaration of security issues must include the

necessary mitigation steps to mitigate emerging threats (Aradau, 2018). Thierry Balzacq explains the securitization process from the standpoint of a security study. A problem that is not considered a threat cannot be classified as a security problem. This is referred to as non-politicization. As a result, no matter how dangerous a threat is, it will not be considered a security issue unless it is politicized (Balzacq, 2019). Politicization is an important stage in the second process. A security issue is considered a security potential at this stage if it can exploit a vulnerability in a security object. Legitimate institutions, such as the state, will become politicized if a security threat alters a country's expected behavior and social, economic, and political stability (Balzacq, 2019). Security issues have been prioritized during the politicization stage and require special attention. Elite political acts as a security issue declarer in the process of politicization. They must identify the threats and explain why the security issue should be one of the security priorities (Balzacq, 2019). Legitimacy is the final stage of the securitization process. Buzan refers to this as securitization (Buzan et al., 1998). This final stage includes the stages of the "speech act" and audience acceptance (Balzacq, 2019). In essence, as an essential component of legitimacy, the political elite or the state must explain in detail to the audience the security issues that have arisen, the nature of the threat, and who is at risk as a result of the threat. During the securitization process, a country declares security issues and must explain mitigation measures to ensure that threats have a minimal impact. That is, when the audience responds to the security issue, the state must have a firm policy or strategy in place to mitigate future threats (Balzacq, 2019). The securitization process is depicted in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Securitization process (Balzacq, 2019; Buzan et al., 1998).

4. Discussion

The emergence of a problem as a security issue does not always occur immediately. Securitization necessitates three steps. As a result, the energy issue, which is part of security, has been securitized. Initially, the energy issue was not regarded as a security issue. The form and definition of the threat itself were not yet clear for political institutions such as the state (Guillaume, 2018). If the threat to energy is not defined and its impact is not felt, the issue will not become a politicized security issue (Guillaume, 2018). With two critical criteria, an issue can become a security issue. One of them is the content of existing issues that have a broader impact on the community (Wishnick, 2010). It implies that society and the community are objects that are under threat from the threat (Wishnick, 2010). This phenomenon is linked to the second criterion, "existential threat." This criterion defines a security issue as one that poses a genuine threat. This threat has the potential to disrupt social, economic, and political life. If an issue lacks an "existential threat," it will not be considered a security issue (Crick, 2012). In the securitization process, the presence of an "existential threat" is critical. The definition of "existential threat" is a real one with far-reaching implications. As a result, the threat in the security issue is not one that is perceived or suspected (Buzan, 1983; Chung, 2017). As a result, states can raise energy issues as security issues if they can define the form of "existential threat" and what objects are threatened if the issue is not addressed. Some countries, for example, believe that energy security issues are unrelated to national security. Several Yugoslavian countries that are members of SEE6 (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) have not prioritized energy security

(Morina, 2015). According to Dirioz and Erbil (2020), securitization in the Balkans has yet to be optimal, as evidenced by internal and external factors. On the inner side of the Balkan countries, they are generally a breakaway state of Yugoslavia and are unstable and dangerous. Furthermore, their countries require additional infrastructure to distribute energy supplies. Externally, foreign countries see the Balkan region as a country with a small population, not a potential market for the energy market, and not well-known as a place to invest. The minimal foreign investment in Balkan countries such as Albania (USD 1.2 billion), Serbia (USD 4.1 billion), Macedonia (USD 0.67 billion), Bosnia (USD 0.48 billion), Montenegro (USD 0.48 billion), and Kosovo (USD 0.24 billion) demonstrates this indicator (Dirioz & Erbil, 2020). This foreign investment is significantly lower than Indonesia's, which reached USD 9.48 billion in the second quarter of 2022 (BKPM, 2022). In fact, according to an analysis of energy demand, the six countries require energy supplies to encourage infrastructure development, economic growth, and the improvement of their people's living standards. However, the region's access to energy has been hampered by a lack of collaboration among regions and government attention (Morina, 2015).

Another example is the country's understanding of renewable energy. Renewable energy and energy security issues were not politicized at the outset. Many countries do not place a high priority on renewable energy as part of the issue of energy security. The International Energy Agency (IEA) compiled information on global energy consumption in 2021. The annual demand for natural gas supplies in the world was 4,400 billion cubic meters (bcm). Meanwhile, the coal supply-demand balance stood at 5,600 million tons per year. Furthermore, the demand for oil supplies reached 103 million barrels per day in 2021. In terms of renewable energy, demand only reached 28% of total global energy consumption in 2021 (IEA, 2022). This point is inextricably linked to the country's continued reliance on fossil energy as the primary source of energy security (Chowdhury et al., 2021). China is another case in point. Initially, China did not prioritize energy security as a component of national security. China sees energy security as one of its top priorities as the world's economy and politics evolve. It is inextricably linked to the Chinese government's desire to maintain its economic hegemony. Diversifying energy to regions other than the Middle East, such as Europe, Central Asia, and South America, is one of them (Liedtke, 2017; Ramadhan & Pratiwi, 2020; Sun, 2014). China, for example, invested USD 28.5 billion in several European Union energy companies between 2011 and 2015. These investments included shares in Total (2%) and British Petroleum (1%), totalling USD 2.8 billion and USD 2.01 billion, respectively. In addition, China National Petroleum Corporation (CPNC) paid USD 510 million for a 50% stake in the French oil company INEOS. Furthermore, Sinopec paid USD 1.5 billion for a 49% stake in British-owned Talisman Energy (Liedtke, 2017). One concrete form of China's expansion into the Latin American region is the establishment of a framework of cooperation known as the Sino-Venezuelan Cooperation Model. This collaboration aims to create synergy in the two countries' energy sectors. The Chinese government loaned USD 12 billion to Venezuela through the China Development Bank. Venezuela must export up to 230 million barrels of oil per day to repay the loan (Sun, 2014).

According to the Chinese government, the country is beginning to prioritize energy issues as part of its national security because a disruption in energy supply from the Middle East would be disastrous for the country's economic growth (Liedtke, 2017; Sun, 2014). Introducing energy issues into the political securitization process necessitates a critical definition stage. When countries recognize the importance of energy issues in national security, they must move the issue from non-securitization to politicization. Balzacq emphasized the importance of the country's political elite describing and defining the types of threats that arise as a result of a security issue (Balzacq, 2019). As a result, if there is an element of "existential threat" in the energy issue, it can be considered a security issue. If the energy crisis does not pose a real threat, it will be treated as a regular issue. However, the process of defining the threat will differ from one another. It implies that security issues will be determined by norms, political ideologies, and a country's national interests (Michael, 2009). Energy-producing countries will ensure that their energy security is aligned with the benefits of selling their energy products on global markets, as described by Orttung and Perovic.

Meanwhile, consumer countries want to ensure that they can meet their energy security obligations by purchasing energy at reasonable prices (Ortung & Perovic, 2010). Energy security in distributor countries is achieved by ensuring that their country is safe as a transit country, as well as secure and politically stable (Chernysheva et al., 2019). As a result, the translation of the perception of energy security will differ because the conditions of each country influence it. Furthermore, the development of "existential threats" in the securitization of energy security issues can begin by emphasizing the context of vulnerability, mistrust, and problem (Hampton, 2011). Countries, for example, must plan for the threats that will arise if their energy security is not met. Will a country's inability to meet its energy needs create a vulnerability? Can these threats increase public distrust of the state's ruling class? Do threats arising from energy security issues have the potential to create new problems? During the politicization process, these three contexts must be clearly defined. This reason is inextricably linked to the nature of the "existential threat," which has the potential to disrupt the dimensions of domestic life as well as the state's overall bargaining power (Gibler, 2010). When the three contexts listed above appear in the context of energy security, the issue shifts from non-securitization to politicization.

The author provides several examples of how many countries' energy security has become politicized. Countries in the Pacific islands, for example, Vanuatu, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and Fiji, have prioritized energy security as one of their country's security concerns. Their background is influenced by the fact that their country is located in the Pacific region and lacks natural oil and gas resources. If the Middle East region is disrupted, so will its energy needs and supply. As a result, they require energy diversification by combining fossil and renewable energy (Taibi et al., 2016). Another empirical example of energy security politicization in Turkey. In 2019, approximately 92.8% of the population lived in urban areas, with the remaining 7.2% living in rural areas (Erat & Telli, 2020). In 2018, natural gas accounted for 30.49% of their total energy consumption, followed by petroleum (30.47%), and coal (30.47%) (17.28%). Turkey, on the other hand, aims to reduce casualty emissions by 21% by 2030 (Erat & Telli, 2020). Turkey's approach to achieving energy security is to prioritize the development of renewable energy in the form of solar power plants to meet domestic needs while reducing carbon emissions (Erat & Telli, 2020). From the Turkish government's perspective, they are attempting to maintain their energy security. On the one hand, they pledge to reduce carbon emissions. Finally, the Turkish government politicized the security issue because it perceived a threat. The Turkish people will lose trust in their government if they do not meet their domestic energy needs.

The international community, on the other hand, will put pressure on the Turkish government if they do not reduce their carbon emissions. As a result, diversifying energy sources is a strategic step in mitigating threats. Another example of the politicization of energy security is the collaboration between the European Union and China to ensure the availability of their energy supplies. Despite the fact that some European countries import oil and natural gas, countries such as France, England, Spain, and Italy have energy companies that supply the world's energy needs (Liedtke, 2017). France's total refined petroleum exports in 2020 are expected to reach USD 4.4 billion, with destinations including Belgium (USD 712 million), the Netherlands (USD 592 million), Germany (USD 536 million), the United States (USD 379 million), and England (USD 230 million). Meanwhile, Italy's total exports reached USD 8.26 billion, with export destinations including Spain (USD 715 million), the United States (USD 652 million), France (USD 638 million), Gibraltar (USD 549 million), and Libya (USD 394 million). Furthermore, Spain's total oil exports totalled USD 7.77 billion. Spain exports oil to several countries, including France (USD 1.2 billion), Morocco (USD 799 million), the United States (USD 744 million), Gibraltar (USD 673 million), and the Netherlands (USD 627 million). Total exports in the United Kingdom reached USD 7.41 billion in 2020. Their top export destinations include the Netherlands (USD 2.04 billion), Ireland (USD 1.36 billion), the United States (USD 914 million), Belgium (USD 766 million), and Nigeria (USD 392 million) (OECD, 2022).

Investment is a necessary component in the operation of their business processes. They will struggle to meet their energy needs unless they invest. On the one hand, China has investment funds that can be used to invest in a variety of energy companies. In terms of energy policy, the Chinese communist government encourages its executive elements to invest in various global energy companies because the country's economic growth is heavily reliant on the energy supply (Sun, 2014). Finally, the European

Union and China collaborate because both have politicized energy security as a matter of national interest. To run their businesses, European energy companies require an injection of investment funds from China. Meanwhile, China requires energy supply to ensure domestic supply. The US Energy Information Administration collects data on China's energy consumption. Coal accounts for 55% of China's energy consumption. Meanwhile, oil is in second place, accounting for 19% of total consumption. China had 1.2 billion barrels of oil reserves as of 2020. China imports petroleum in general to meet its domestic needs. The Middle East (50%), Russia (15%), and Africa (13%), are the countries that import petroleum to China. Meanwhile, European oil imports account for 4% of all Chinese imports (EIA, 2022).

Securitization is the final stage of this process. According to security studies, securitization of security issues occurs when political elites, such as the state, declare a threat. According to Balzacq, the state must do three things at the very least during this securitization process: declare, gain acceptance from the audience, and mitigate threats (Balzacq, 2019). According to the previous explanation, security politicization is based on each country's national security ideology and priorities. As a result, the securitization process will be determined by each country's interests (Michael, 2009). The Russian Federal Government, for example, has implemented an energy policy to increase the resilience and supply of their domestic energy supply. One of the objectives is to explore the Siberian region, which has oil (15%) and coal (12%) reserves (Saneev, 2014). The Russian government sees a real threat in the form of energy scarcity, a lack of energy supply for the community, and a stifling of Russia's regional development, particularly in the Eastern part (Saneev, 2014). The Russian government declared this threat in a government decree included in the Russian Federation's Energy Strategy. The Russian government decree states that the state must protect its people, state, and economy from the threat of an energy supply shortage. Furthermore, the state is required to ensure the continuity of energy supply at reasonable prices (Alfadh, 2012). The Russian government did not face opposition when it declared the issue of energy security because, in the domestic sphere, energy supply was required to support the growth of the property industry (Saneev, 2014). A similar phenomenon occurs throughout the Pacific region, most notably in Fiji, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands. In terms of energy distribution, only 77% of Pacific region residents have access to electricity (Taibi et al., 2016). When the issue of energy security was declared by Pacific island leaders at a Pacific Energy Minister meeting, the audience openly accepted the declaration because most people in the Pacific region faced energy supply constraints, a lack of infrastructure, and a slow rate of economic growth (Taibi et al., 2016). So, when Pacific governments launch a renewable energy program, their main hope is that the program will boost economic growth in their country (Taibi et al., 2016).

Mitigation efforts are another strategic step that the government must take in energy securitization. If the political elite does not make mitigation efforts, energy securitization will be meaningless. Acceptance of speech acts by the audience will be ineffective if the state does not own the mitigation measures. Threats posed by energy security issues can be mitigated either domestically or through international cooperation. Northern European countries, for example, have an agreement known as the "Nordic Program for Cooperation on Energy Policy" (Kilpeläinen, 2020). Norway is a country in Northern Europe that is relatively well-established in terms of energy resources. This reason is inextricably linked to several Norwegian investments and state-owned companies engaged in North Sea exploration, exploitation, and production (Kilpeläinen, 2020). However, to meet its energy needs, this region is developing renewable energy sources such as wind and water. These policies are governed by agreements between Northern European countries. The energy policy regulates the amount of electricity supplied to each Northern European country, as well as the setting of taxes, selling and buying prices for each energy supply, and future energy development strategies (Kilpeläinen, 2020). Threats posed by security issues can be mitigated both collectively and independently. This can be seen in Iran's approach to mitigating the threat of energy scarcity in the country. Iran possesses 9.3% of the world's total oil reserves. However, the country lacks sufficient oil refineries (Bahgat, 2015). Furthermore, as a result of international sanctions, the majority of Iranian crude oil is exported to China and India (Bahgat, 2015). The Iranian government has set aside USD 60 billion to build refineries and develop renewable energy sources such as nuclear power (Bahgat, 2015). Of course, Iran's primary goal is to maintain its

energy supply while balancing domestic energy needs and exports abroad. The author concludes the securitization process in Table 3.

Table 3. Stage of securitization.

	Stages	Explanation	Empirical Case
Securitization Process	Non-politicization.	Energy has not yet become a security issue because state actors have not defined the types of threats that arise from the energy sector. State actors continue to believe that energy security is not a top priority for national security (Guillaume, 2018; Wishnick, 2010)	Despite their country's high demand for energy access, several former Yugoslav countries have not made energy security a top priority (Morina, 2015); Prior to becoming a world economic power, China did not consider threats in the energy sector to be part of national security (Liedtke, 2017; Sun, 2014).
	Politicization	At this stage of politicization, the state sees the energy sector as a security issue because it has defined a "existential threat." When a threat creates new vulnerabilities, mistrust, and problems, the energy sector can become a security issue (Hampton, 2011; Michael, 2009; Orttung & Perovic, 2010).	To avoid the threat of energy disruption in the Middle East region, countries in the Pacific islands have begun to develop renewable energy technologies (Taibi et al., 2016); the Turkish government has begun to develop new renewable energy in the form of solar panels to reduce the gap in domestic energy needs that cannot be met by fossil energy (Erat & Telli, 2020).
	Securitization	At this stage, state actors officially declare the threat's form, respond to the audience, and strive to mitigate the threat (Balzacq, 2019).	The Russian government conducts energy exploration and exploitation in the East Siberian region in order to meet domestic energy needs and support the growth of the property industry (Saneev, 2014); Northern European countries declared a "Nordic Program for Cooperation on Energy Policy" in order to diversify energy sources due to high domestic demand. Efforts to mitigate these threats are centered on regulating the amount of electricity available, taxes, and future energy sector development strategies (Kilpeläinen, 2020).

5. Conclusions

Based on the empirical examples and analysis presented in the preceding chapter, the author concludes that the process of securitizing energy security issues does not occur overnight. Security issues must be securitized in three stages: non-securitization, politicization, and securitization. The author discovered several other empirical findings related to state-led securitization. Energy issues will not be considered essential in the context of security studies unless they contain an element of "existential threat." For example, as part of their securitization process, Balkan countries must prioritize energy security. This is evident from the insufficient infrastructure for distributing their energy supply. Furthermore, their country is not a destination for foreign investment due to its unstable political situation. If there is a real

threat to energy, the issue will become politicized. These threats can disrupt daily life as well as a country's political, economic, and social stability. As a result, the state elite must define the real threats posed by the energy crisis. These threats can take the form of an energy supply shortage and a disruption in the country's energy security. The authors discover that, as a result of politicization, several countries have begun to prioritize energy issues as part of their national security. China's cooperation with Latin American countries such as Venezuela to secure their energy supply is one example. China hopes that this energy supply will be sufficient to sustain its economic growth. The goal is to keep domestic energy supplies available. Securitization is the final stage of this process. This process is critical because the defined threat must be accepted by the audience or society. When the state declares a threat to the audience, the securitization process works flawlessly as long as the audience accepts the threat. The state elite must have mitigation measures in place so that the state strategy for mitigating threats arising from energy issues can be seen in a concrete way. Empirically, the process of securitizing energy issues is carried out by the state in the form of a declaration. For example, the Russian government declared the securitization of energy issues in the form of a government decree known as the Russian Federation's Energy Strategy. Aside from Russia, countries in the South Pacific region declared energy issues to be part of their national security in an effort to reduce reliance on Middle Eastern energy supplies and diversify energy sources toward renewable energy. As a result, the authors conclude that the securitization of energy security issues between the state elite and the audience is ongoing. The securitization process can be flawless if the state elite can accurately define threats and implement mitigation measures. On the one hand, the audience does not deny the existence of threats, and acceptance will make it easier for the state to mitigate threats posed by energy issues, which can disrupt political, economic, and social stability.

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